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ENCOURAGING DONATION OF ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANTATION BY
REQUIRING REQUEST
MAXWELL

J. MEHLMAN, J.D.

Abstract Requiring hospitals to request permission from nextof-kin to harvest organs from a deceased patient is a positive step
toward reducing the shortage of organs for transplantation. The
"required request" laws, however, should rely on immunity from
liability rather than criminal sanctions to encourage compliance.

The Organ Shortage
The demand for transplant organs far exceeds the supply.

In 1982, for example, despite estimates that 7,000 persons
were awaiting kidney transplants, and that, based on criteria of
donor suitability, over 40,000 cadaver kidneys should have
been available, only 3,691 cadaver kidneys were
lransplanted. 1 With the introduction of immunosuppressive
drugs like cyclosporin that substantially increase the probability of a successful transplant outcome, the demand for organs
has become even greater. 2
Why are donor organs in such short supply? There is no
serious technological impediment to their availability. Harvesting involves a relatively simple surgical procedure.3 Potential donors often can be maintained on artificial systems
following death long enough to permit transplant organs to be
removed before they deteriorate. Following removal, organs
can be preserved extracorporeally (albeit for a limited time)
until transplantation can take place.
The organ shortage does not appear to be a product of
unwillingness to donate. In Colorado 60 percent of those who
have drivers licenses have indicated, by filling out a form on
their license, their intent to donate their organs upon death 4
People are just as willing to agree to have organs removed from
dead relatives. In France, for example, 90 percent of those who
were asked gave their consent to the removal of transplant
organs from next-of-kin. 5

The Consent System
The problem seems to be that people are not being asked
to donate, or are not being asked in the right way. There are
several features of the consent system in the United States that
might contribute to this.
First, the presumption is that people do not want to donate
their organs or those of their next-of-kin. In order to donate,
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therefore, this presumption must be rebutted by express consent, given either by the potential donor himself or by someone,
such as a relative, who is authorized to consent in his stead.
Second, th·ere is no legal requirement that people at some
point declare their intent either to donate their own organs or
those of their next-of-kin, or to refuse to donate.
Finally, little is done to encourage people to donate their
own organs or those of their relations. Potential donors are
aided in declaring their intent to donate by the provisions of the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, which enables them to fill out
donor cards or special portions of drivers licenses. 6 Private
organ procurement agencies handle the administrative tasks of
matching organs to potential recipients and facilitating
shipment? But there are few incentives to consent to donate or
to request consent, beyond an individual's own sense of moral
obligation.
Until recently, for example, only a few hospitals asked
relatives of potential donors for permission to harvest. organs,
and then only infrequently. This reluctance derives at least in
part from the perceived unpleasantness of forcing the family to
confront the topic of donation in their time of grief.
Furthermore, physicians and hospitals are concerned
about potential legal liability for harvesting organs without
adequate permission. Lack of consent to harvest might subject
the health care provider to civil and criminal penalties for theft,
conversion, and possibly violation of state laws governing
disposal of the dead. Asking next-of-kin for permission without sufficient sensitivity might give rise to an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress· 8 Obtaining ostensible permission from the family might not insulate the harvester from suit if there were an interfamily conflict over
whether or not to consent to donation, or if the family later
alleged that its consent was invalid due to duress or incapacity
by virtue of grief.
Moreover, the structure and functioning of provider institutions militate against requesting donation. The treating
physician, who is in the best position to know that a patient is
dead or dying, and thus to initiate the donation request, typically is not involved in and derives no specific benefit from
organ transplantation. Obtaining consent to donation would
take his time away from his priority activity: the treatment of
other patients. In addition, if consent is obtained, the donor
often must be kept on life support systems beyond the point of
death to maintain the suitability of his organs for transplantation until they can be harvested by a transplant surgeon. This
requires equipment and skilled care that might be devoted
instead to salvageable patients.
Finally, economic incentives for donation are virtually
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nonexistent. Under federal law, no person may receive valuable consideration for acquiring, receiving, or transferrring an
organ for transplantation. 9 Thus, neither donors nor procurers
may recover more than reasonable compensation for their
costs.

Steps to Increase the Supply of Donor Organs
Against this background, a number of steps might be taken
to increase the supply of donor organs. For example, we could
spend more on education programs to encourage people to
donate their own organs or those of their next-of-kin. Or we
could reward willingness to donate with a priority claim on
future transplant organs for the donor or for a designated
beneficiary. 10 Alternatively, we could relax the prohibition on
economic incentives for donation-such as by permitting a
market in organs or by offering tax credits to donors.U All of
these approaches, however, are disfavored. Educational programs are expensive, and the marginal cost of stimulating
additional organs for transplantation may be deemed to be
excessive. A priority system based on donation would disadvantage those who were unable to donate for medical reasons
and would be difficult to administer. Tax credits would disproportionately benefit persons in higher tax brackets. Finally, a
market in organs would favor the wealthy, who could outbid
the poor, and might result in fewer rather than more organs
available for transplantationP
Another approach would be to switch frorri the presumption that individuals do not wish to donate unless they expressly take action to the contrary, to a system in which
individuals are presumed to consent to donate unless they
express their unwillingness to do so. This is known as "presumed consent," and has been adopted in France. 13 The question that arises is what opportunity must be provided for
unwillingness to be expressed? Is the burden to come forward
on the individual-say by executing an instrument that prohibits donation? If so, how is the existence of the instrument to be
made known to organ harvesters? 14 On the other hand, if organs
cannot be harvested unless the donor or next-of-kin have
waived their right to object, the presumption has shifted back
to one of presumed nonconsent-the system currently in
operation in the United States.
A more extreme alternative is mandatory harvesting, with
neither the donor or next-of-kin having the ability to block
donation. 15 While this can be supported on the basis that any
property rights that an individual has in his organs should lapse
upon death, or at least that they are subordinate to the need to
save other human lives, this approach is unacceptable in view
of religious objections to cadaver mutilation and the trend in
favor of patient autonomy.

Required Request
A middle ground between the largely voluntary system
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that traditionally has prevailed in this country and more coercive measures, called "required request," 16 has been gaining
acceptance in the last several years. This alternative focuses on
the main cause of the shortage of cadaver organs: the failure to
ask permission for donation. Under required request, the
hospital (and perhaps other institutions such as hospices) must
establish a mechanism for insuring that a deceased patient's
next-of-kin are asked to consent to donationP Required request laws have now been passed in twenty-four states. 18 A bill
to facilitate state-required request programs has been introduced in Congress. 19
Whilerequiredrequestlaws are probably a step in the right
direction, they raise several questions. First, it is not clear how
they are to be enforced. New York reportedly levies a $1000
fine for each violation;w Kentucky imposes a fine of between
$100 and $500.21 By and large, however, the required request
statutes do not create explicit criminal or civil sanctions for
noncompliance. Enforcement would therefore seem to depend
on enforcement actions by government officials or private
parties, which would result in court orders mandating compliance on penalty of contempt, or on the deterrent effect of
actions for damages that might be brought by potential organ
recipients claiming to have suffered injury as a result of the
hospital's failure to request consent.
In either case, detecting the violation of the required
request law would be difficult. Some required request laws
facilitate this by requiring that the making of the request be
noted on the death certificate. 22 Potential plaintiffs-such as
state health officials, organ procurement agencies, or patient
groups-could monitor the records to determine if the notation
is absent, and suit could be brought against a hospital that
routinely failed to comply. (In the absence of a requirement
that a public record be made, violations could be detected only
by more problematic devices such as interviews of next-of-kin
or disclosures by hospital staff.) But even where the making of
a request must be noted on the death certificate, the statutes
contain broad exceptions. No request need be made in New
York, for example, if there is "actual notice of opposition" by
the decedent or next-of-kin, or reason to believe that donation
is contrary to the decedent's religious beliefs. 23 A hospital
could therefore explain the absence of a request notation on a
death certificate by contending that a member of the family
objected or that the decedent belonged to a religion that was
known to oppose organ harvesting, and there would be no
simply way of determining the validity of the excuse. It is also
likely that a health professional who simply did not want to
raise an unpleasant issue with next-of-kin would rely on one of
these exceptions, with little risk of being penalized.
Furthermore, most required request statutes do not mandate that a record be made of a refusal of consent by the
family, 24 and even fewer provide for recording that a request
was not made because of known religious or other objection. 25
Hospitals therefore could defend an enforcement action premised on a small number of recorded consents on the ground that
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this reflected a large number ofnonrecorded refusals or known
objections, rather than a routine failure to request consent.
The lack of effecive enforcement provisions may well be
deliberate. State legislatures may be reluctant to impose sanctions on providers, or may believe that providers will adhere to
the legislative command without threats. Indeed, it is arguable
that providers welcome the laws as an excuse that can be given
to family members when the issue of donation is raised.
Moreover, one method of facilitating enforcement-requiring
a public record of why a request was not made or refusedmight raise the objection that it interfered with the privacy and
religious rights of patients or their families.
In the absence of more effective enforcement tools,
however, the question is whether the required request statutes
will overcome reluctance to request donation. As noted earlier,
this reluctance stems from the psychological relationship between providers and next-of-kin, the structural relationship
between members of the hospital staff, and concerns about
liability. A number oflaws provide for special training for the
hospital personnel who will make the request; 26 this might
alleviate some of their resistance to raising the issue with
relatives. But the statutes do little to address the other two
problems, and some actually exacerbate them.
As noted earlier, the hospital's staff structure frustrates
organ harvesting by instead emphasizing treatment of salvageable patients; the treating personnel are relatively insensitive
about the patient's status as a potential donor, and therefore
make little effort to facilitate donation. But this also has an
important benefit: it reduces the chance that the patient's
treatment will be compromised or that the patient prematurely
will be pronounced dead, in order to foster harvesting. The
possibility of such conflict of interest is reflected, for example,
in the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, which stipulates that the
physician who tends the donor, or who certifies the death, may
not be part of the transplantation process. 27 This safeguard is
absent from most of the required request statutes, however; 28
by and large, they do not mandate separation of functions
between treating and harvesting personnel. This oversight
should be avoided in future required request legislation and
corrected in existing laws.
The required request laws also generally do not address
liability concerns on the part of those involved in obtaining
consent to donation. 29 Unlike the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act, 30 they do not immunize persons acting in good faith to
obtain consent. They thus omit an important positive incentive
for providers to responsibly increase the supply of donor
organs.
Because the enforcement of required request sanctions is
ineffective, a carrot rather than a stick approach seems preferable. Immunity from civil and criminal liability would be the
positive incentive for requesting donation. This would offer
protection for anyone (hospital, medical staff organization,
physicians, nurses, social workers, organ procurement agency
operatives) who acted in good faith in requesting organs for
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donation. They would avoid liability to the family of whom the
request was made (for example, for intentional infliction of
emotional distress), and also to potential donees (who otherwise might complain that inadequate measures were taken to
obtain transplant organs). 31
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